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WHO IS LIBERATED? 
THE NOTION OF LIBERATION WHILE ALIVE 
IN SOME SELECTED INDIAN TEXTS 
Johannes Bronkhorst, Université de Lausanne 
Abstract 1 
This article looks at three texts — the Mnava Dharmastra, the Bhagavadgt, and a passage 
from the Mahbhrata that records a discussion between two self-proclaimed liberated persons — 
and tries to determine whether liberation in them is thought to be possible while alive. It turns out 
that the first two of these texts have rather hazy notions of liberation and use the terms liberation 
and liberated ambiguously. The third one is categorical that liberation while alive is possible, but 
specifies that it concerns liberation from features such as attachment. A further comparison with 
Jainism and Buddhism brings to light hat liberation from rebirth typically is not possible while one 
is alive, but liberation from certain cumbersome features is. 
In this paper I will consider the notion of liberation while alive in a few selected 
texts. The first one is the Mnava Dharmastra. 
Manu 6.44 reads: 
 kapla vkamlni kucelam asahyat /  
 samat caiva sarvasminn etan muktasya lakaam // 
This might be translated: 
 A bowl, the foot of a tree, a ragged piece of cloth, a solitary life, and equanimity towards 
all—these are the marks of a liberated person. 
Olivelle, in his recent edition-cum-translation of the Mnava Dharmastra 
(2005:150), translates it differently: 
1 This is the text of a paper read at a seminar “Erlöst leben – oder sterben, um befreit zu 
werden?” held at the University of Zurich in May 2008. 
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 A bowl, the foot of a tree, a ragged piece of cloth, a solitary life, and equanimity towards 
all—these are the marks of a renouncer. (my emphasis, JB) 
Olivelle tries to justify the translation “renouncer” for Sanskrit mukta in a note 
(p. 290): 
 renouncer: although the term mukta means literally “a liberated man”, it is used here in the 
same way as moka (see 1.114 n.) to refer to a wandering ascetic. Bühler’s “one who has 
attained liberation” and Doniger’s “one who is Freed” are, I think, overly literal. The dis-
cussion here is about asceticism and ascetics, not about liberation and liberated individuals. 
In the note referred to in this note, Olivelle states (p. 243): 
 the Sanskrit term moka literally means liberation. Manu, however, attaches a technical 
meaning to the term, using it as a synonym of renunciation and the fourth order of life 
dedicated exclusively to the search after personal liberation. The term moka has the same 
meaning when used in the common compound mokadharma, which is a section of the MBh 
and a distinct topic in medieval legal digests (nibandha). Manu makes a clear distinction 
between this renunciatory asceticism and the life of the vedic retiree, which he designates as 
sanysa (see 6.86 n.). This term, which is the common word for renunciation in later 
literature, is never used by Manu with that meaning. Bühler’s “(manner of gaining) final 
emancipation and (of) renouncing the world”, and Doniger’s “Freedom, and renunciation” 
ignore the technical use of these two terms here and in ch. 6. For a more detailed study, see 
Olivelle 1981. 
The more detailed study here referred to is an article that appeared in the Journal 
of the American Oriental Society in 1981, and which bears the title “Con-
tributions to the semantic history of sanysa”. True to its title, it says a lot of 
interesting things about sanysa and its cognates, but virtually nothing about 
moka. All it says about this topic is found in the following laconic statement (p. 
270): “Manu deals with the fourth rama, i.e. renunciation, which he calls 
moka […], at 6.33–85.” It follows that the translation “renouncer” for Sanskrit 
mukta, and similarly the translation “renunciation” for Sanskrit moka, are based 
on Olivelle’s fiat, not on any arguments that are presented or referred to in his 
book.2 
A priori I feel doubtful about this reinterpretation of words which have a 
literal meaning that is as clear as water to all users of Sanskrit. As a matter of 
2 Olivelle (2008:xxi f.) thinks that Avaghoa, too, uses the term moka in the techincal 
meaning given to it by Manu, and uses this as one of several arguments to show that 
Avaghoa knew Manu’s text. This argument may need reconsideration. 
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fact, a few verses earlier in the same passage Manu uses almost the same word: 
vimukta rather than mukta. This earlier verse, 6.40, speaks about the same person 
and calls him dehd vimukta. This time Olivelle translates “freed from his 
body”, and we cannot but agree. The obvious conclusion would be that, if our 
mukta is freed from his body, there is no clear reason not to consider him “freed, 
liberated” rather than a mere “renouncer”. 
Olivelle does not draw this conclusion. The whole verse in which dehd 
vimukta occurs (6.40) reads: 
 yasmd av api bhtn dvijn notpadyate bhayam / 
 tasya dehd vimuktasya bhaya nsti kuta cana // 
Olivelle translates this as follows:  
 Because that twice born has not been the cause of even the slightest fear to creatures, he has 
nothing to fear from anyone after he is freed from his body. (emphasis mine, JB) 
The English after he is freed from his body is somewhat ambiguous, but it seems 
clear that Olivelle understands the verse to refer to the state after death. In order 
to arrive at that interpretation, he subtly adjusts the translation to this under-
standing. A more literal interpretation of the verse would be:  
 Because that twice born is not the cause of even the slightest fear to creatures, he, being 
freed from the body, has nothing to fear from anyone. 
In this more natural interpretation of the verse, the expression “being freed from 
the body” would seem to qualify the living ascetic. We will return to this issue 
below. 
Olivelle’s biased interpretation of the passage becomes especially clear in 
his translation of verse 6.78. This verse reads: 
 nadkla yath vko vka v akunir yath / 
 tath tyajann ima deha kcchrd grhd vimucyate // 
Olivelle translates: 
 When a tree falls from a river bank, the bird leaves the tree; when he abandons this body in 
like manner, he escapes the alligator’s painful grasp. 
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This translation suggests that liberation “from the alligator’s painful grasp” 
occurs at death, when the person concerned abandons his body. However, this 
translation is highly problematic, as Olivelle himself indicates in an accom-
panying note. The note reads (p. 291): 
 I think commentators and translators alike have failed to understand this simile, which, I 
must admit, has been cast in turbid syntax. All take the tree falling from the bank and the 
bird leaving the tree as two independent similes. That is very unlikely, given that the first 
foot concludes with vka (“tree”), and the second foot begins with it, indicating that the 
latter picks up the theme of the former. Further, they take grha (which I think means 
alligator rather than shark) only with the giving up of the body in the second half of the 
verse. I think the last foot is connected to both the simile and the ascetic giving up the body. 
The meaning then seems to be that a bird flying off before the fall of the tree escapes the 
alligator’s grasp in the river. Likewise, when an ascetic abandons the body before its natural 
fall at death (which is here compared to the fall of the tree), he escapes the grasp of the 
alligator, probably Yama (6.61). This fits in nicely with the theme of the preceding verse, 
namely, that an ascetic must abandon the body voluntarily. 
With all respect to Olivelle’s attempts to make sense of this verse, one does have 
the feeling that his efforts were not necessary, for the syntax of this verse is far 
from turbid. It is turbid if one wishes to understand it in Olivelle’s manner, but if 
one does not, it can be translated without difficulty, as follows: 
 Just as a tree abandons the bank of a river, or a bird abandons a tree, abandoning in the same 
way this body he is liberated from the alligator’s painful grasp. 
Here the person concerned is described as abandoning his body. As a result, we 
may assume, he is liberated from his body. The precise meaning of abandoning 
one’s body, and of being liberated from one’s body, is open to debate, but there 
is no compelling reason to believe that it is to be identified with death. Indeed, 
“abandoning the body”—the Sanskrit term used is kyotsarga—is one of the six 
obligatory duties for members of the Jaina mendicant order while they are alive.3 
It appears, then, that several of the problems mentioned by Olivelle turn 
out, at closer inspection, to be no problems at all. The words moka and mukta 
are not used in a technical meaning in the Mnava Dharmastra, the syntax of 
verse 6.78 is not turbid, and verse 6.40 can be interpreted more literally. How-
ever, the removal of these problems leads inescapably to the conclusion that 
Manu refers to living persons as being liberated. The marks of such a living 
3 Jaini, 1979:189 f. 
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liberated person, moreover, are a bowl, the foot of a tree, a ragged piece of cloth, 
a solitary life, and equanimity towards all; he is not the cause of even the 
slightest fear to creatures, and he abandons his body, which probably means that 
he engages in ascetic practices of a certain sort. 
It is yet understandable why Olivelle went a long way to prove that living 
liberated persons are not recognized by Manu. The way the presumably liberated 
person is described in the relevant section of the Mnava Dharmastra (6.33–
86), which is the section that deals with the fourth stage of life, is confusing or 
worse. Rather than describing a person who has reached his goal, it characterizes 
him as setting his mind on moka (mano moke niveayet; Manu 6. 35, 36), as 
desiring moka (mokam icchan; Manu 6. 37). This suggests that the liberated 
person is not completely liberated after all. The section is furthermore full of 
rules which the presumably liberated person must follow. Once again, one gains 
the impression that a state to be attained is talked about, rather than a state that 
has been attained. And to top it all, the section points out in verse 58 that “even 
an ascetic who has freed himself is shackled by what is received with a show of 
reverence” (cd: abhipjitalbhais tu yatir mukto ‘pi badhyate; tr. Olivelle). In 
other words, the liberation Manu talks about is relative, even confused. He calls 
“liberated” a person who strives for liberation, treats the liberated person as 
someone who must be told what to do, and specifies that being liberated is no 
guarantee against being shackled.4 
This, I think, is the conclusion we have to draw from Manu’s references to 
liberation: Manu has a rather hazy, perhaps self-contradictory, notion of what 
liberation is. We can try to bring consistency into his statements by deciding that 
certain words are not used in their ordinary meanings, that certain verses must be 
interpreted in artificial ways. This will only hide from us that Manu’s verses do 
not present a clear and coherent notion of what liberation is. 
Perhaps this should not surprise us. Manu himself does not believe in liber-
ation. For him the state of householder (ghastha) is the best from among the 
four stages of life (6.89). He pronounces in favour of something he calls 
vedasanysa which leads to the param gati (6.88, 93), the highest state, but 
there is no hint that this highest state is liberation. To this must be added that it is 
rather tricky for a lawgiver to accept the existence of living and yet irreversibly 
liberated people. Such people would obviously fall in a category totally different 
from everyone else. They would not have to follow rules, and law books would 
4 This manner of speaking also occurs elsewhere in the text, in connection with death, for 
example; so Manu 7.143d: mta sa na sa jvati. 
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have no advice to give them. It would have been more convenient for Manu if 
Olivelle had been right, if one could say that every liberated person is a dead 
person. Manu does not say so, as we have seen. He acknowledges the existence 
of living liberated people, but in a way takes their liberation away from them by 
subordinating them to his rules, and by pointing out that their state is not 
irreversible. This suggests that the belief in the existence of liberated people in 
Manu’s time was wide-spread, too wide-spread to be simply ignored.
After the Mānava Dharmaśāstra, let us consider the Bhagavadgītā. Here we can 
follow the lead of Peter Schreiner, who brought out a study and translation of 
this text in 1991. In the introduction he states (p. 30):
Die Bhagavad-Gītā stellt sich […] als ein Text dar, der den Übergang vom Ideal des 
videhamukta (“Entkörpert-Erlösten”) zum Ideal des “Lebend-Erlösten” (jīvanmukta) mar-
kiert.
Schreiner argues that the Yoga which the Bhagavadgītā modifies and replaces 
strove for liberation at the moment of death. He cites in this context one verse in 
particular, which refers to a specific Yogic state and then continues (Bhag 
2.72cd):
He who abides therein also at the moment of death, he reaches the brahmanirvāṇa
(sthitvāsyām antakāle ‘pi brahmanirvāṇam ṛcchati).
According to Schreiner, this notion of liberation at death changes in the Bhaga-
vadgītā: “der Erlösungsbegriff [konnte] umgedeutet werden zu einer rein geisti-
gen, rein psychischen Angelegenheit, zu einer Haltung, die man auch im Leben 
und in der Welt verwirklichen konnte” (p. 30).
If I understand this passage correctly, Schreiner claims that the Bhaga-
vadgītā accepts, at least in some of its passages, the ideal of the jīvanmukta, the 
person liberated while alive. He does not say that this term is actually used in the 
Bhagavadgītā, and indeed it is not. But if he is right, we would expect that the 
Bhagavadgītā uses the expression “liberated” or some similar term in connection 
with people who are still alive. Unfortunately Schreiner gives no concrete refer-
ences to passages that do so; to my knowledge no unambiguous passages to that 
effect exist. Schreiner does speak about bhakti “teilhabende Hingabe an eine 
Gottheit” and the role that Kṛṣṇa plays in it, and then states (p. 33):
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 Die Teilhabe an Ka ahmt also einen Yoga-Weg nach, welcher vermutlich nicht mehr 
ausschliesslich als ein Weg völliger und endgültiger Entsagung (mit dem Ziel erlösenden 
Sterbens) angesehen wurde; mit dem Ideal der Bhakti setzt sich die Vorstellung der 
Erlösung bei Lebzeiten endgültig durch. Thesenhaft vereinfacht: Verkörpert der yukta 
(“Geeinte”) das Ideal jener Erlösungslehren, denen Erlösung nur nach dem Sterben denkbar 
war, so belegt der bhakta (“der hingebungsvoll Teilhabende”) den vollzogenen Übergang 
zur Lehre von der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten. 
I am not sure why this passage should be applicable to the Bhagavadgt. Recall, 
to begin with, Bhag 2.72, which we considered above, and which stated that he 
who abides in a specific Yogic state also at the moment of death reaches the 
brahmanirva. Schreiner cited this verse as being an illustration of the Yogic 
belief in liberation at death. However, the fulfilment of bhakti comes at death, 
too, judging by Bhag 8.5: 
 He who dies remembering only me at the moment of death, when abandoning his body, he 
will go to my state of being; there is no doubt about this. 
 antakle ca mm eva smaran muktv kalevaram / 
 ya prayti sa madbhva yti nsty atra saaya // 
What is more, I have the impression that the Bhagavadgt speaks about liber-
ation and the liberated person in the same vague and somewhat inconsistent 
manner as the Mnava Dharmastra. Consider Bhag 5.28: 
 The sage who controls his senses, mind and intellect, who is intent on liberation, who has no 
desire, fear or wrath, he is really eternally liberated. 
 yatendriyamanobuddhir munir mokaparyaa / 
 vigatecchbhayakrodho ya sad mukta eva sa // 
Here the person who is “intent on liberation” (mokaparyaa) is, in the very 
same breath, characterized as being “eternally liberated” (sad mukta eva). The 
similarity with Manu’s characterization of the liberated person as “setting his 
mind on liberation” and as “desiring liberation” is striking. 
The general presupposition in the Bhagavadgt, however, would seem to 
be that liberation takes place at death. Consider Bhag 5.23: 
 He who can in this world, before he leaves his body, bear the impulse that arises from desire 
and wrath, he is controlled (yukta), he is a happy man. 
 aknothaiva ya sohu prk arravimokat 
 kmakrodhodbhava vega sa yukta sa sukh nara 
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Nothing would have been easier here than to read mukta (“liberated”) for 
yukta (“controlled”). But this is not even recorded as a variant reading in the 
critical edition of the text. This suggests that life before death is not the time 
during which one can be liberated.5 
There are many more passages that might have to be considered. I will not 
do so here. Let me simply state that I have found no indications in the Bhaga-
vadgt that compel us to believe that this text accepts the notion of liberation 
while alive. A number of passages suggest the opposite. Others betray a rather 
imprecise employment of the words mukta and moka. 
The two texts which we have considered so far—the Mnava Dharmastra and 
the Bhagavadgt—suggest that there was some imprecision in the use of the 
terms “liberation” and “liberated”, at least in Brahmanical circles, around the 
time when these texts were composed. This should not really surprise us. The 
Sanskrit verb muc- and its derivatives are very common and can be used in 
contexts that have nothing to do with high spiritual goals. One can be liberated 
from many things. The question “liberated from what?” was therefore as 
essential to the early Indians as it is for modern research. We are primarily inter-
ested in liberation from sasra, from the cycle of renewed births. It is therefore 
legitimate to ask how one could possibly be alive and liberated from the cycle of 
rebirths. A living being is by definition in his cycle of rebirths. For some this 
may be their last birth, but this does not change the fact that it is one in their 
series of births and rebirths. Understood in this way, liberation while alive is a 
contradiction in terms.6 
5 Nelson (1996:21) interprets Bhag 5.23 and 5.28 together: “Bhagavad Gt 5.28 tells us that 
the ascetic who has controlled his senses and attained identity with Brahman is eternally 
liberated (sad mukta eva). This is possible, we read at 5.23, ‘prior to release from the body 
(prk arra-vimokat).’ This interpretation leaves out of consideration inconvenient 
elements. 
6 This was already pointed out in the invitation to this meeting: “wenn Befreiung eine Be-
freiung vom immer wiederkehrenden Leben (sasra) ist, dann dürfte es eine Befreiung im 
Leben (jvanmukti) eigentlich nicht geben.” Cf. Sprockhoff, 1962:151: “Wenn das gegen-
wärtige Dasein in der Welt des Sasra auf den Wirkungen des Karman beruht und als 
Genuss dieser Wirkungen, als ‘Vergeltung an dem Täter der Werke’ (kriy-kraka-phala) 
bezeichnet wird, wenn ferner die körperliche Existenz, die wir notwendig im Begriffe des 
‘Lebens’ mitzudenken haben, ein ‘Komplex von Organen des Wirkens’ (krya-karaa-
saghta) genannt wird – wie soll es dann eine ‘Erlösung bei Lebzeiten’ geben, wenn die 
Erlösung als eine ‘Befreiung’ vom Sasra definiert wird, dem eben diese wichtigsten 
Faktoren des physischen Daseins unterliegen?” 
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This observation has to be qualified. It is conceivable that certain people 
are alive, but have undergone inner transformations which guarantee that they 
will never be born again. They are like the prisoner who knows that he will be 
freed soon. They are not liberated in the strict sense, but they are as good as 
liberated. If the transformations they have undergone are moreover irreversible, 
if nothing whatsoever could ever undo them, then the expression “liberated 
while alive” becomes understandable, though strictly speaking still meta-
phorical.7 
However, the term “liberated” can also be used with regard to features that 
bind a person to this world. He can then be liberated from these features, and 
therefore presumably certain of liberation from this world after death, while yet 
living in this world. With this in mind I propose to consider a third passage, a 
conversation recorded in the Mahbhrata (12.308); it has recently been studied 
by James Fitzgerald (2003). This conversation calls itself, in Fitzgerald’s trans-
lation, “a conversation between a man who had gained Absolute Freedom in the 
midst of the royal parasol and such things and the woman who had gained 
Absolute Freedom with the triple staff of renunciation”.8  In other words, it 
opposes two persons who are both convinced that they are, at the moment they 
confront each other, liberated. 
The two participants in this conversation are King Janaka of Mithil and a 
nun called Sulabh. Both of them have serious doubts about the liberated state of 
the other. It is not our task to decide who of the two is “really” liberated; the epic 
appears to opt for Sulabh. We are rather more interested in the notion of liber-
ation that the two accept. It turns out, as a matter of fact, that the disagreement 
between the two does not concern the question what liberation is. They agree on 
the features from which a liberated person is believed to be freed. 
There is a lot of talk of freedom and freed persons in this conversation, and 
it is not always clear what the protagonists are supposed to be free from. How-
ever, some passages are explicit in this regard. King Janaka describes himself as 
“freed from passion” (muktarga (28)), “freed from attachments” (muktasagin 
(31), muktasaga (37), sag[t] […] mucyate (44)). He is apparently also free 
7 I cannot deal with the (primarily Advaita) notion according to which liberation is really 
beginningless and only needs to be realized. It is however to be noted that the expressions 
jvanmukta and jvanmukti flourished primarily, if not exclusively, in such intellectual 
surroundings. 
8 Mhbh 12.308.19: savda […] chattrdiu vimuktasya mukty ca tridaake. 
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from the pairs of opposites, about which it is stated: “That transcends all the 
different stages and is Perfection.”9 
Information about liberation can also be extracted from Sulabh’s criticism 
of the king:10 
 Why, King of Mithil, does someone who is Freed from the pairs of opposites (such as, 
“This is mine and this is not mine”) ask “Who are you, whose are you, and where do you 
come from?” O lord of the earth, what indication is there that one is Freed when he treats 
some as an enemy, others as allies, and others as neutrals in victory, in alliances, and in war? 
[…] What indication is there that one is Freed when he does not see the sameness in 
kindness and unkindness, in weakness and in strength? So you are not Freed, and the conceit 
you may have in believing you have Absolute Freedom should be suppressed by your 
friends, as medicines might be used for someone who is unconscious. O suppressor of your 
enemies, if one looks at these points of attachment here and those there and sees them within 
himself, what indication is there then that he is Freed? 
The liberated person is here, once again, characterized as being free from the 
pairs of opposites, and free from attachments, as seeing the sameness in kindness 
and unkindness, in weakness and in strength (more literally perhaps: as having 
the same eye with regard to kindness and unkindness, with regard to weakness 
and strength). Sulabh further points out that a king is always dependent upon 
others, suggesting that the liberated person is independent. Since the liberated 
person is the opposite of those who are bound by attachment and aversion (abhi-
agvarodhbhy baddha (166)), he is not so bound. Among the further 
characteristics that we can cull from Sulabh’s words, we find that liberated 
persons have no attachment to their own body (svadehe nbhiaga[] (162)), 
that they are, once again, free from attachment (muktasaga (164)), and that they 
have overcome the bonds that fettered them (pn kramya (164)). 
It seems, then, that King Janaka and the nun Sulabh agree on the main 
characteristics of a liberated person. Such a person is primarily and essentially 
9 Mhbh 12.308.30cd: mahad dvadvapramokya s siddhir y vayotig. 
10 Mhbh 12.308.127b-132: ida me syd ida neti dvadvair muktasya maithila / ksi kasya 
kuto veti vacane ki prayojanam // ripau mitre ‘tha madhyasthe vijaye sadhivigrahe / 
ktavn yo mahpla ki tasmin muktalakaam // […] // priye daivpriye caiva durbale 
balavaty api / yasya nsti sama caku ki tasmin muktalakaam // tad amuktasya te 
moke yo ‘bhimno bhaven npa / suhdbhi sa nivryas te vicittasyeva bheajai // tni 
tny anusadya sagasthnny aridama / tmantmani sapayet ki tasmin 
muktalakaam // 
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liberated from attachment, from the pairs of opposites, from aversion. The cycle 
of rebirths does not, or hardly,11 enter into the picture. 
Toward the end of her discourse, Sulabh makes a remark that may be 
revealing. She says: “Someone who is already Freed does not become Free; 
someone who is already at peace does not become peaceful.”12 This remark, I 
propose, is directed against the attitude that finds expression in Manu’s observa-
tion to the extent that the liberated person sets his mind on liberation or desires 
liberation, and in the statement of the Bhagavadgt according to which the 
liberated person is intent on liberation. It appears to be directed against all those 
who confuse striving for liberation with being liberated. Sulabh considers her-
self as being liberated and not as striving for liberation. She obviously considers 
herself liberated while alive. When she has to specify what she is liberated from, 
she stipulates that she is liberated from attachments and the like, not from the 
cycle of rebirths. 
All the three texts we have considered so far are Brahmanical texts. I have 
argued elsewhere that Brahmanism borrowed the notion of liberation from 
religious currents that originated outside the realm where it held sway. It adopted 
this notion with all that came with it, adapting it to its own needs and require-
ments.13 Since some of the currents that were originally independent of Brah-
manism have survived, it will be interesting to see what position they, or at least 
one of them, take with regard to liberation and death. 
One of these currents is Jainism. Its founder—or more correctly, its most 
recent “fordmaker” (trthakara)—was sure that he would never be born again. 
He was, in that sense, sure of his forthcoming liberation. But was he liberated at 
the time of his last earthly existence, say from the time of his enlightenment 
onward? 
The answer provided by the Jaina tradition is a clear no. This is how Paul 
Dundas explains the difference between liberation and enlightenment (2002: 
104): 
11 Mhbh 12.308.32 states that “people’s deeds produce their coming to be again” (janayati […] 
karma n […] punarbhavam), which may hint at the effect of liberation on rebirth. 
12 Mhbh 12.308.188: mukto na mucyate ya ca nto ya ca na myati. 
13 Bronkhorst, 2007. In spite of claims to the contrary, the idea of liberation took time to settle 
in Brahmanism: “References to derivatives of the verb muc are surprisingly rare in the early 
Upaniads. They appear mostly in the Bhadrayaka and Kaha, and many of the usages 
that exist do not suggest Advaitic liberation.” (Fort, 1998:30). 
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 Spiritual deliverance (moka) is defined in simple terms by Umsvti ([Tattvrtha Stra] 
10.5)14 as release from all karma. This should in its finality be clearly distinguished from the 
attainment of enlightenment which, after the cultivation of morally positive attitudes, the 
practice of austerity and the gradual suppression of negative discriminative mental 
processes, involves the uprooting of deluding karma which is then succeeded by the removal 
of the remaining three harming karmas, thus liberating the innate qualities, such as 
omniscience, of the jva. Enlightenment, however, does not of itself entail death, for the 
operation of the four non-harming karmas is still unimpaired, with life and name karma 
guaranteeing the continuation of embodied existence and experience karma ensuring bodily 
sensations, although the latter point was a source of sectarian dispute for the Digambaras 
who denied that a kevalin’s feeling karma could bring about an effect such as hunger. The 
enlightened person, whether fordmaker or kevalin, may therefore spend a considerable 
period after enlightenment engaging in mental and physical activities such as walking, 
preaching and meditation. However, no new karma is bound by these activities nor is it 
possible in this state to carry out acts of violence, even involuntarily. 
It is clear from this passage that the enlightened Jaina sage, the kevalin, is alive 
but not liberated. The liberated Jaina sage is called siddha, but he is not em-
bodied and is therefore dead from a physiological point of view: the siddha 
resides in the realm of the siddhas “at the top of the universe where it will exist 
perpetually without any further rebirth in a disembodied and genderless state of 
perfect joy, energy, consciousness and knowledge” (p. 105). 
The Jaina tradition, as can be seen from the above, accepts the existence of 
two different but clearly defined and irreversible transitions: the moment of 
enlightenment and the moment of liberation. The second of these two coincides 
with physical death. If one is to follow this scheme, strictly speaking the only 
way to call people liberated even though they, or rather their bodies, are still 
alive, is by downplaying the importance of the second transition, death. This is 
what Advaita Vednta in particular appears to have done. akara on Bhadra-
yaka Upaniad 4.4.6, for example, states: “For the knower who dies there is no 
change of condition—no state different from that experienced while living.”15 I 
will not say more about Advaita, whose ideas about jvanmukti have been 
studied by others,16 but will very briefly touch upon the question how early 
Buddhism considered these two transitions: enlightenment and death. 
This is not the occasion for an in-depth study of the notion of “liberation” 
in Buddhism, so that some impressions must suffice. The term “liberated” 
14 This is 10.3 in Tatia’s translation (1994). 
15 na hi viduo mtasya bhvntarpattir jvato ‘nyo bhv[a]; tr. Nelson, 1996:24. 
16 E.g., Sprockhoff, 1964; Nelson, 1996; Fort, 1996; 1998. 
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(vimutta) is often used in the Pli canon, very often in connection with the mind 
(citta, cetas).17 It is most typically used with reference to people who are still 
alive, perhaps never with reference to people who have died. But the freedom 
referred to does not normally seem to concern rebirth, but rather the taints 
(sava): The Buddha and the Arhats have been able to free themselves from 
those taints. This would allow us to say that the Buddha and the Arhats were 
liberated in life, but only if we specify what they were liberated from: the taints, 
or perhaps something else. 
However, no overhasty conclusions should be drawn from this. The precise 
significance of the first transition, the one associated with enlightenment, was 
not altogether clear to the early Buddhists, because a debate took place whether 
the state of Arhat was really irreversible, whether an Arhat could still fall back 
into the ordinary state of being.18 With this vital issue pending, it is not obvious 
that an Arhat is really and fully liberated from the cycle of rebirths. Some 
schools also maintained that the two transitions—enlightenment and death—
coincided in the case of certain Arhats, the so-called “level-headed” (samarin) 
Arhats.19 
The precise significance of the second transition, the one at death, is not 
easy to determine either. The Buddha is believed to have refused to answer the 
question whether a Buddha (tathgata) exists after death. This is the last of the 
four so-called “unexplained” (Pli avykata, Sanskrit avykta) questions, to 
which the Buddha always reacts by remaining silent.20 It is safe to claim that the 
Buddha, or any Arhat for that matter, was not believed to be reborn after the life 
in which he attained Arhatship, but this is a negative observation. The early 
Buddhist texts add no positive information to add to this. 
It is common in scholarly literature to distinguish between nirva and 
parinirva. The Buddha is supposed to have reached the former while in his 
thirties, the second at death in his early eighties. Indeed, parinirva is often 
used to refer to the death of the Buddha. This does not, however, appear to be 
justified. The term parinirva is used, in early Buddhist literature and in certain 
Mahyna Stras, almost as a synonym of nirva.21 More precisely perhaps, as 
17 Note that “[i]n many […] places in the Suttapiaka the verb vi + muc is attested as a textual 
variant for adhi + muc, and vice versa. In the places where the verbs are alternatives, they 
refer to a state of concentration rather than liberation.” (Wynne, 2007:79) 
18 Bareau, 1957:244 f. 
19 Bareau, 1957:248 f. 
20 E.g. SN II p. 222 f. Cf. Oetke, 1994:88 f. 
21 Thomas, 1947; Nattier, 2003:148–49 n. 26. 
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Thomas pointed out (1947:295), “Nirva expresses the state, parinirva the 
attaining of the state, or in Pli, he parinibbyati, attains the state, and then 
nibbyati, he is in the state expressed by nibbna.” 
This is not the occasion to elaborate these observations, nor to comment on 
them. It is time to turn to the theme of this meeting: “Erlöst leben – oder sterben, 
um befreit zu werden?” Even our superficial discussion of a few texts and 
currents suggests that this formulation of the question is too broad to allow of a 
meaningful answer without additional specifications. 
It is important to know, when the early texts speak of liberation, what the 
person concerned is supposed to be liberated from. If it is from the cycle of re-
births, liberation is likely to coincide with death, for the simple reason that the 
person remains part of this cycle until then. Jainism takes this position, in spite 
of the fact that its sages may have entered long before their death stages from 
which there is no return and from which liberation is guaranteed. 
Liberation can also be thought of as freedom from something else, say 
attachment. In such cases liberation in life becomes conceivable. It goes without 
saying that being liberated while alive, among those who believe in it, is an 
enviable qualification, which almost predictably led to competition between 
claimants and their followers. King Janaka and the nun Sulabh illustrate this. 
Lawgivers, on the other hand, felt no doubt hesitant to admit the existence of 
people who do not fit into any legal category, and who are not bound by any 
rules. The early Buddhists had second thoughts about assigning the irrevocable 
title of Arhat to people still alive, and therefore considered the possibility that 
Arhats, too, might fall back. We have seen that Manu and the Bhagavadgt, 
though not denying the possibility of liberation in life, reduce it in practice to the 
solemn pursuit of a high but distant aim. 
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